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Attorney Loyalty and Client Perjury-A
Postscript to Nix v. Whiteside
Bennett L. Gershman*

Most experienced prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys
probably would agree that perjury in the criminal justice system occurs often. Although the frequency of perjury has never been demonstrated empirically, it is not surprising that with so much at stake,
prosecution and defense witnesses would be tempted to fabricate testimony to meet the exigencies of the case. Detecting and dealing with
perjurious testimony, however, is another matter. Implicated are complex legal and ethical problems for both prosecutors and defense attorneys.' Moreover, the judiciary's response to these problems has been
largely formalistic and deficient in enunciating sufficiently clear standards to guide future behavior.
For example, prosecutorial tolerance, and even subornation of
perjury, usually is analyzed objectively for its impact on the
factfinder's evaluation of the evidence, rather than focusing subjectively on the prosecutor's willfulness or bad faith.2 For purposes of
remedying prosecutor misconduct in the future, such a response is
wholly unsatisfactory. That issue, however, is a subject for another
essay. The present discussion concerns the extent to which a criminal
defense attorney legally and ethically may cooperate with his client in
concealing the truth.
Defense counsel's commitment to truth can vary greatly in the
course of counsel's protecting the interests of his client. At one extreme are acts deliberately designed to conceal the truth, such as se~
creting evidence, fabricating defenses, and suborning p e r j ~ r y .Such
conduct can never be justified or condoned. At the other extreme are
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1963, Princeton University; LL.B.
1966, New York University.
1. See J. BURKOFF,CRIMINALDEFENSEETHICS--LAW AND LIABILITY
(1986); B.
GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
(1985); G. HAZARD,ETHICSIN THE PRACTICE
OF
LAW(1978).
2. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
3. See, ag., Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1474; In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp
360 (E.D.Va. 1967), o r d , 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967); In re Branch, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 238 (1969); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024
(1976); In re Rosenberg, 276 A.D. 268, 93 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1950).
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options which legitimately permit suppression of the truth. These include, for instance, advising a client to refuse to testify or comply with
a subpoena ordering the production of records, pursuant to a valid
claim of privilege." Between these ethical and legal extremes, however, are more nebulous situations, such as "advising" a client of the
legal consequences of possessing certain documents, or suggesting the
availability of "hypothetical" defenses, knowing full well that the client will engage in conduct or tailor his story to mesh with that a d ~ i c e . ~
Given the adversary system, in which "winning" can overshadow the
quest for truth,6 extremely complex questions arise: Is a criminal defense lawyer required to play the dual roles of "champion" of his client, and "gatekeeper" of the temple of justice? Are these roles really
compatible? If so, what are the rules of the game?
Consider in this connection perhaps the most difficult question of
all: How much, if at all, can a criminal defense lawyer cooperate in his
or her client's decision to commit perjury? Courts,7 commentator^,^
and bar committeesghave grappled with this question for years without offering clear or consistent guidelines. Any principled response
must take into account some very hard questions. Under what cir4. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892).
D R 7-102(A)(7) (West 1984)
5. See MODELCODE OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY
("In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not
counsel or assist his client in conduct
that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent"); MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
Rule 1.2(d) (West 1984) ("a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client and may assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the lav;"); MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONALCONDUCTRule
1.2(d) comment ("There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of
questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime of fraud might be committed with impunity.").
6. See Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event of Questfor Truth? 1963 Wash.
U.L.Q. 279.
7. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (lawyer must withdraw or disclose intended
pejury); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (withdrawal request predicated on
alleged client perjury in middle of bench trial denied client fair trial); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (attorney's unnecessary disclosure to judge of client's intended pejury has chilling effect on effective representation).
8. Callan and David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERSL. REV. 332 (1976); Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Rieger, Client Perjlrry: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional
and Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121 (1985).
9. AM. TRIALLAWYER'SASS'N CODERule 1.2 (1980) (the ATLA Code contains no specific rule on client pejury since the entire matter is subsumed under Rule 1.2 relating to strict
attonley confidentiality regarding client pejury); MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIs l L r r Y DR 7-102(A)(7) (West 1984); MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCTRules 1.2(d),
3.3(~)(West 1984); STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-7.7 (West 1984).

...
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cumstances, for instance, does the lawyer ever really "know" that his
client's proposed testimony is false? Is it sufficient if the lawyer simply
disbelieves his client's story, or that of his client's witnesses?1° Does it
make any difference if the attorney learns of a plan to perjure during
the trial, as opposed to prior to the trial? What actions can the lawyer
properly take when he believes that his client intends to commit perjury? Is the prevention of pejury more important than loyal and aggressive representation? Can the lawyer simply remain silent, and
passively allow the perjury to occur? Can he threaten to impeach his
client's testimony? Withdraw from the case? Report his client's actions to the judge?
Last Term, in Nix v. Whiteside, the Supreme Court for the first
time addressed several of these questions. The Court unanimously
agreed, under the facts of the case, that the lawyer's refusal to assist
his client's plan to commit perjury did not deprive the defendant of his
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, nor of his
right to testify in his own defense.12 A majority of the Court essayed
the ethical questions
as well and, in obiter dicta, concluded that
"under no circumstances may a lawyer either advocate or passively
tolerate a client's &ving false testimony."13 The majority went fur10. A threshhold issue in dealing with client pejury is the extent to which the lawyer must
be convinced that his or her client intends to commit pejury. Model Rule 3.3(c), for example,
advocates a standard of "reasonable belief" rather than actual knowledge that the client's testimony will be false. Many courts and commentators, however, have advocated a much more
rigorous standard. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977)
("mere unsubstantiated opinion" of attorney insufficient); People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11
(Colo. 1981) (mere inconsistency in client's story insufficient); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965) (lawyer should be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that client's
testimony will be false); Rieger, Client Pejuly: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and
L. REV.121, 149 (1985) (same as ABA Opinion).
Ethical Issues, 70 MINN.
11. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
12. Id. at 997. The Supreme Court has never explicitly held, but has consistently assumed,
that a criminal defendant has a due process right to testify in his own behalf. Id. at 993; see
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.745,751 (1983) (In holding that an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to pursue every nonfrivolous point on appeal, the Court
noted that "the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to
testify in his or her own behalf."); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S.605, 612 (1972) (the Court, holding that a statute requiring a defendant to testify at the
beginning of the defense's case, if defendant is going to testify at all, is unconstitutional, observed,
"Whether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well as a matter of
constitutional right."); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,225 (1971) ("Every criminal defendant
is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so." However, the Court held that
the privilege to testify does not give a defendant the right to commit pequry.).
13. 106 S. Ct. at 996. The extent to which a lawyer may stand mute, and permit his client
to testify in a free narrative fashion, is one of the most controversial issues relating to client
pejury. See infra note 24.

...

Heinonline - - 14 Am. J. Crim. L.

99 1986-1987

Vol. 14:97 (1987)

AM. J. CRIM.LAW

ther, however, and formulated specific rules of permissible and impermissible attorney behavior.
The facts were uncomplicated. Whiteside was tried in an Iowa
state court for stabbing to death a friend, Love, following an argument
over drugs. One of the principal issues was whether the killing was in
self-defense. During pretrial preparation, Whiteside consistently told
his court-appointed counsel that he had not actually seen a gun in the
deceased's hand. About a week before trial, however, he changed his
story, stating that he had seen "something metallic" in Love's hand,
and that "If I don't say I saw a gun I'm dead." Whiteside's attorney
warned him that if he so testified, he would advise the court of the
defendant's proposed pejury, seek to withdraw from the case, and attempt to impeach his client's testimony. Whiteside testified, stating
that he "knew'y Love had a gun but had not actually seen a gun in
Love's hand. After the jury returned a murder verdict, Whiteside
moved for a new trial, contending that his lawyer's admonition not to
state that he saw "something metallic" denied him a fair trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and the Iowa Supreme
Court alkned, holding that an attorney's duty to his client does not
extend to assisting the commission of perjury.14
Whiteside then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel's actions denied him effective
assistance of counsel and the right to present his defense. The district
court denied the writ, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.15 The court found that although a criminal defendant's privilege to testifjr does not include a right to commit perjury, counsel's
admonition that he would inform the court of the planned perjury
constituted a threat to violate an attorney's duty to preserve client
confidencesI6and, as such, a breach of the standards of effective representation laid down in Strickland v. Washington.l7
The Supreme Court reversed, and reinstated the conviction.18
Every Justice agreed that Whiteside had not been denied effective representation under the Strickland test, which requires a defendant to
show that counsel committed such serious professional errors as to
14. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1978), rev'd sub nom. Whiteside v.

Scum, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
15. Whiteside v. Scum, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'dsub nom Nix v. Whiteside, 106
S. Ct. 988 (1986).
16. Id. at 1330.
17. 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
18. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
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undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.lg An attorney's
duty to his client, agreed the five-Justice majority, is limited to legitimate conduct and does not include assisting his client in presenting
false evidence.20
Although not required to, the majority discussed what it believed
were appropriate ethical responses for lawyers faced with client perjury. The attorney should attempt initially to dissuade his client from
his u n l a h l ~ l a n . 2If~that course is unsuccessful, the attorney is obligated to reveal his client's conduct to the
and even to seek to
withdraw from the ~ a s e . 2The
~ majority emphasized that under no
19. 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694. The Court in Strickland emphasized that a claim of ineffectiveness has two components. First, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was
"deficient" in that he "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Second, the defendant must
show that he was prejudiced, in that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687.
20. 106 S. Ct. at 994.
21. "It is universally agreed that at a minimum the attorney's first duty when confronted
with a proposal for perjurious testimony is to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful
course of conduct." 106 S. Ct. at 996. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975); MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
Rule 3.3 comment
@Vest 1984).
22. The Court stated: "Indeed, both the Model Code and the Model Rules do not merely
authorize disclosure by counsel of client perjury; they require such disclosure." 106 S. Ct. at 995
(emphasis in original). This is not altogether correct. The Model Rules appear to require discloCONsure only after the client has given false testimony. See MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
D U C ~Rule 3.3 comment (West 1984). Moreover, the Model Code appears to allow, but does not
require, an attorney to reveal his client's intention to commit perjury. See MODELCODEOF
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101(C)(3) (West 1984). Nor is the Court's reliance on
DR 7-102@)(1) correct, since that provision concerns a lawyer's obligation when faced with a
client who has already committed perjury. The courts are equally unclear. Compare State v.
Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970) (announced intention by defendant to commit
perjury is not within the confidences an attorney is bound to respect) and People v. Salquerro,
107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980) (same) and State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224
S.E.2d 174 (1976) (same) with United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.
1977) (attorney may not volunteer a mere unsubstantiated opinion that his client's protestations
of innocence are perjured) and Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 @.C. 1980) (unnecessary
to betray confidences of client). Moreover, disclosure may impinge on the attorney-client confiRESPONSIBILI~
DR 4-101 (West
dential relationship, see MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
1984), as well as the defendant's right to a fair trial. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555

F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
23. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975);
CONDUCTRule 3.3 comment (West 1984). Several courts
MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
require the attorney to withdraw upon learning of a client's intention to commit perjury. See
Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); People v. Blye, 223 Cal App. 2d 143,
43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965); In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979). A withdrawl
motion probably will be denied if counsel refuses to disclose to the court the basis for the motion.
See United States v. Henkel, 799 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1327 (1987);
People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981); People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433
N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980). See also Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the
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circumstances should the lawyer assist his client in giving, or even passively permit his client to give, false testimony.24 Moreover, counsel's
threats to reveal Whiteside's perjury and to withdraw from the case
were indistinguishable, according to the majority, from disclosing client misconduct such as tampering with witnesses or jurors.2s "In
short, the responsibility of an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court
and a key component of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for
truth, is essentially the same whether the client announces an intention
to bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors or to commit or procure perjury. No system of justice worthy of the name can tolerate a lesser
standard."26
Four Justices concurred in the result, but would have limited
their consideration to the constitutional questions involved. These
Justices resisted the invitation to enter this "thorny" and "controversial" area and to formulate rigid rules of professional conduct for attorneys. Since Whiteside had no constitutional right to his counsel's
assistance in committing perjury, nor to counsel's silence about the
plan, no violation under the Strickland test had occurred. That is not
to say, emphasized the concurring Justices, that a sixth amendment
violation could not be shown in other related circumstances. This
showing might depend on the level of the attorney's certainty about
the proposed pejury, the stage of the proceedings at which the attorney discovers the plan, or the methods used by the attorney to try to
dissuade his client. The concurring Justices cautioned, however, that
attorneys who adopt "the role of the judge or jury to determine the
facts pose a danger of depriving their clients of the zealous and loyal
advocacy required by the Sixth A~nendment."~~
Defense Lawyer's Conjicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN.L.J. 75
(1981).
24. Prior to Whiteside, the approach most widely accepted by the courts was the free narrative, whereby an attorney who believed that his client would testify falsely would first inform the
court that he advised his client not to testify, and then remain mute while the defendant gave his
testimony, without conducting any examination or arguing the testimony to the jury. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-7.7 (West 1984); Burger, Standards of Conducts: A Judge's
Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM.L.Q. 11, 13 (1966). See also United States v. Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151
(9th Cir. 1980); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978); Butler v. United States, 414
A.2d 844 @.C. 1980); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 @a. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v.
Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52, 679 P.2d 174 (1984); People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433
N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980); In re Goodwin, 279 S.C. 274, 305 S.E.2d 578 (1983).
25. Preventing a client from tampering with witnesses or jurors arguably stands on an entirely different footing than threatening to expose a client's own false testimony. Testimony by a
defendant is inextricably connected with constitutional considerations; no such considerations
apply to the corruption of witnesses or jurors.
26. 106 S. Ct. at 998.
27. Id. at 1006 (citation omitted).
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Nix is a troubling decision. As a jurisprudential matter, the case
is a peculiar blend of constitutional doctrine and legal morals. The
holding is fairly narrow; the dicta is extremely broad. Essentially the
Court emphasized, as it has on many previous occasions, that perjury
is obnoxious to the justice system?* and announced for the first time
that a lawyer's refusal to cooperate in his client's plan to lie does not
render the lawyer ineffective under the sixth amendment. This result
was predictable. Wholly unpredictable, however, was the Court's willingness to enter the ethical twilight zone of attorney-client interaction
and to promulgate a code of attorney behavior in the context of client
perjury.
Several points are notable. First, this excursion into defense lawyer ethics stands in sharp contrast to the Court's historic unwillingness to impose ethical rules for prosecutors or other government
officials. The Court recently wrote: "Nothing in the Constitution
vests in us the authority to mandate a code of behavior for state offic i a l ~ . " Similarly,
~~
the Court observed: "The Due Process Clause is
not a code of ethics for prosecutor^."^^ And in one recent case in
which a prosecutor engaged in outrageous m i s c ~ n d u c t the
, ~ ~ Court,
after issuing a few paragraphs of mild reproach, concluded: ''Defendant's] trial was not perfect-few ar+but neither was it fundamentally
unfair."32 It became the function of the four dissenting Justices to
outline, painfully, the numerous ethical rules which the prosecutor violated. Ironically, in cases involving prosecutorial subornation of perjury and suppression of evidence, the Court has carefully avoided
ethical condemnations, stating: "Nor do we believe the constitutional
obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or willfulness, of the
prose~utor."~~
Unevenhanded ethical jurisprudence promotes cynicism and disrespect, and can even encourage further government misconduct.34 Aggravating the concerns over such disparate treatment,
of course, is the overriding legal and ethical precept that it is the obligation of the prosecutor, rather than that of defense counsel, "not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."35
28. Harris v. New York,401 U.S. 222 (1971); United States v. Knox,396 U.S. 77 (1969);
Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969); United States v. Noms, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).
29. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135. 1143 (1986).
30. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986).
Id. at 2473 (citation omitted).
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).
See Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22 CRIM.L. BULL. 131 (1986).
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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Moreover, Nix v. Whiteside, as with other decisions involving the
role of counsel for indigent defendants, continues a trend which
threatens to undermine the fierce and dedicated representation to
which such defendants are constitutionally entitled. Just as it is virtually inconceivable that a privately retained lawyer would ever file an
"Anders brief" alleging no meritorious issue,36it is equally inconceivable that a privately retained lawyer would threaten to impeach his
client's proposed testimony, or report his conduct to the judge, It is
hardly surprising that virtually all of the decisions dealing with client
perjury involve attorneys who are either public defenders, or court appointed. This is not to suggest that a poor defendant has any greater
right to commit perjury than does a wealthy one, or that retained lawyers necessarily would tolerate client perjury more readily than lawyers paid by the state
Nor it is altogether clear that public
defenders view the issue of client perjury differently than do retained
counsel. However, any attorney who feels that he has to justify to the
court the correctness or effectiveness of his representation, or who is
inclined to play the role of jury or judge, may, as the concurring opinion in Nix warned, deprive his clients of the zealous advocacy guaranteed by the Constitution.
Finally, to the extent that Nix authorizes defense counsel to engage in conduct which effectively drives his client off the witness
stand, it constitutes an insensitive and unwarranted intrusion into a
defendant's right to testify in his own behalf.38 Crucial to notions of
civilized justice are concerns for a defendant's individual freedom and
dignity. Such concerns ought to be respected, even at the risk of false
Surely the abolition of common law rules of witness disqualification did not imply that defendants thereafter would give only
truthful testimony. Thus, shocking as it may seem to some, a defendant probably should be allowed to lie, even though he has no right to
lie. The jury, not defense counsel, should be the safeguard against perjury. As Justices Brennan and Marshall observed: "The role of the
defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument and
36. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.745 (1983)
(indigent defendant has no constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to argue on appeal
all nonfrivolous points).
37. To be sure, privately retained counsel may raise the issue from a sincere belief in the
ethical considerations. On the other hand, such counsel may raise the issue for tactical reasons,
such as in seeking a continuance or engineering a mistrial. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575
F.2d 727,731 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir. 1967),
af'd after remand, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
38. See supra note 12.
39. G. HAZARD,supra note 1, at 127-35.
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defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal pro~ess."~'To be sure, a lawyer should not cooperate in his client's perjury, assist him in any manner, or use such testimony in
argument to the jury. Such conduct, however, is a far cry from the
conduct of the lawyer in Nix. He was functioning not as a defense
counsel, but as a surrogate prosecutor. Simultaneous commitments to
one's client and to the cause of abstract justice are incompatible. To
the extent that bar codes and court decisions mandate such behavior,
they demand from attorneys the impossible. If the defendant wishes
to lie, the lawyer should sit back and let his client say what he wants to
say?l From a tactical standpoint, this may be the worst possible scenario for a defendant. But, that is his ch0ice.4~ Nothing in Nix v.
Whiteside prevents state bar associations from enacting ethical rules
consistent with this approach.43

40. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983).
41. Admittedly, this approach is less extreme than the "full representation" approach proposed by Professor Freedman. See Freedman, Prof&onal Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH.L. REV. 1469 (1966). Under the "full representation" approach, which some courts have sanctioned, the attorney argues to the court and jury
that which he knows to be false. See Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 877-878 (Alaska 1980);
People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235 (1965).
42. Arguably, a lawyer standing mute and refraining from direct or redirect examination,
and then failing to support the defendant's testimony in closing argument, conveys to the jury a
pretty clear signal as to defense counsel's view of the evidence.
43. The Court stated:
\men examining attorney w.nduct, a court must be careful not to narrow the wide
range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the
State's proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts.
106 S. Ct. at 994. Justice Brennan similarly observed: "mhe Court cannot tell the states or the
lawyers in the states how to behave in their courts, unless and until federal rights are violated."
Id. at 1000 (wncumng opinion) (emphasis in original).
Thus far, twenty-one states have adopted rules substantially based on the ABA Model
Rules; New York continues to follow the ABA Model Code. See 3 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABADNA) 93 (April 1, 1987); 3 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABADNA) 190 (June 24,
1987).
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